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ABSTRACT
A field study of real estate agents' transactions demonstrates that business friendship
affects the negotiation process and the outcome of transactions more for agents with 10 or
more years of experience in real estate brokerage than for less experienced agents. Newer
agents rely more on friendly relations and on impression management techniques to do well in
a transaction, while the more experienced agents consider genuine business friendship and its
norms useful for facilitating transactions. Different sc ipts for friendship may explain the
consistency within each of the two groups.
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I.  Introduction
Real estate brokerage historically has been based on interpersonal relationships.
However, the literature has offered little consideration of how those relationships may affect
real estate transactions. The role of relationships was most likely neglected because it is
difficult to study. Effects of relationships are particularly difficult to examine because they are
only one among numerous other contingencies of the sale that also affect the outcome
variable of closing price.
Relationships between agents become important when we consider the process of the
transaction. The agents and especially the clients remember the process of the negotiation, as
well as the closing price. A smooth process can increase the probability that the clients will
recommend the agent; a rough one may guarantee that the agent won't get that client's repeat
business.
This interview-based study investigated the effect of friendship on the process and
outcomes (other than selling price) of real estate transactions in Berkeley, California. An
outline of the hypotheses used in this study is followed by a description of the Berkeley real
estate market and the methods used.
IA.  A Model of how Friendship May Exert it’s Effects
Friendship is a multi-faceted and ill-defined concept (cf. Fischer, 1982; Krackhardt,
1990). The term "friendship" tends to be used casually (Fischer, 1982). We use the term for
social, intimate friends, and for the people we meet on the job with whom we have what are
technically termed "friendly relations" (Kurth, 1970). We can think of relationships as ranging
from unacquainted to intimate; interactions with business "friends" (people with whom we have
been acquainted for some time, and who we like but with whom we are not intimate) constitute
the vast majority of our interactions.
Friends' interactions may be driven by a cognitive "script" for dealing with friends during
personal business transactions. A script is a cognitive structure, incorporating roles and the
ordering of events, which helps us make inferences about a situation and guides our
interaction strategies (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Schank & Abelson, 1977). The existence of scripts
can only be inferred. A "friendship script" contains the individual's characterizations of a friend;
his or her expectations of how a friend should act toward him or her; and a set of behavioral
guidelines appropriate in the context of the specific friendship.
Laboratory-based research on the effects of friendship on transactions suggested the
basis for the hypotheses I tested in the field with the Berkeley agents.i Research has shown,
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for example, that friendship means more than rewards from a single interaction, so friends
tend towards equality in outcomes (Morgan & Sawyer, 1967). Friends may also make
concessions to each other because of their concern for maintaining the relationship (Fry,
Firestone & Williams, 1983). A recent study compared people's pricing strategies for a variety
of hypothetical commodities when they thought about transacting with a friend or with a
stranger (Halpern, 1992, 1994). The results showed that, even without communicating with the
transaction partner, friend-buyers and friend-sellers agreed on the prices for the commodities,
while stranger-buyers and stranger-sellers disagreed. There is also evidence that friends may
reach agreements faster than strangers (cf. Schoeninger & Wood, 1969). Examining this result
in the real world suggests that agents who are business friends may start out closer to the
selling price than agents who do not know each other. Business friends may open escrow
sooner than strangers (subject to the limits set by law). In hypothesis form:
H1: Among agents who are business friends, the first offer will be closer to the
selling price than it will be among agents who do not know each other.
H2: Time between the initial offer and the opening of escrow will be shorter for
business friends than for agents who do not know each other.
Close relationships tend to be characterized by harmony and equality (Boulding, 1973;
Rubin, 1973). Friends anticipate future interaction; they attempt to maximize their partner's
outcomes and maintain a sense of fairness so that the partner will want to interact again
(Shapiro, 1975). There are general norms of trustworthiness and disclosure (Lazarsfeld &
Merton, 1954; Zand, 1972). People expect their friends to want to (and to try to) reach
agreement on most important topics with them; and for there to be a lack of conflict generally
(Kelley, 1979; Seybolt & Murnighan, 1990). In real estate brokerage we can expect that:
H3: Agents who are business friends will perceive the transaction process as
smoother and easier than will agents who do not know each other.
H4: Agents who are business friends will have fewer negotiations regarding
the terms of sale after inspections.
Friends also can expect each other to provide information that will help maintain their
cooperative interaction (Schoeninger & Wood, 1969; Deutsch, 1958). Agents might provide
additional information to their friends.
H5: Agents who are business friends get advance notice of houses and properties.
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IB.  Anticipating Effects of Relationships in the Field
While most of the research on friendship has been conducted in the laboratory, the
effects of friendship on supposedly economics-based decisions have been explored in some
field settings. Baker (1984), for example, found that cliques among floor traders affect option
price volatility. Economic models of the movement of stock prices had omitted friendship.
Krackhardt's (1990) finding that friendship relations were related to a union authorization
outcome was not as surprising, but he was able to illustrate the process by which friendship
exerted its effect.
Real estate agents are a good population for study because their relationships are
critical to their work and because they are natural negotiators. They negotiate with a variety of
individuals, ranging from people they never met before to people they consider to be social
friends. Thus, their daily negotiating routine provides a natural experimental design,
theoretically allowing investigation of differences in interactions between friends and between
strangers.
IC.  Rationality and the Residential Real Estate Market
Residential real estate is an imperfect market, in which both client buyers and client
sellers are relatively uninformed, and in which the clients are often uncertain about how to
maneuver. The decision to buy or sell a house is peculiarly intense; it is, after all, the place one
will be living, or the place one has lived, with all the memories and emotions associated with
moving. Buyers and sellers therefore often turn to real estate agents to help them navigate the
market.
The agents also face uncertainty. They must deal with the emotions of their client; and
they must sort through the information specific to the house in question. In addition, the agent
needs to evaluate, obtain, or estimate the information held by the opposite agent in order to
achieve a satisfactory transaction for the client (the buyer or the seller). Obtaining listings is a
time-consuming task; as is deciding which houses to visit. Moreover, it is often best for
everyone concerned if the agents "move" the property quickly.
The literature review above referenced studies about the principals involved in
transactions. Real estate agents, on the other hand, represent he principals. The agents see
their role as mostly informing and facilitating the interaction. However, since the actual sellers
and buyers are often poorly informed, many potential buyers and sellers closely follow their
agents' recommendations -- in fact, they may put themselves almost entirely in their agents'
hands. Moreover, since the agents' long-term interests are best served by fairly representing
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their clients (that is, the agents' long-term interests reduce their incentive to cheat in the
short-term) it is reasonable to assume that t e agents bargain as if they have the clients'
interests at heart (cf. Williamson, 1985). Moreover, as some agents reported, they do become
personally involved with the client: they learn about the client's children and pets, about their
fears, worries, and problems, financial, marital, and otherwise. Several agents, in fact,
commented that they sometimes encounter difficulties in becoming too emotionally involved
with a client's transaction. Like a therapist, these agents may find the emotional intensity of the
interaction to be draining:
"Professional people will deal with business-- but it is an emotional business. You
become the client's psychologist. It is a very emotional, tough business for each
transaction." (35)ii
Other agents noted that over the course of the transaction, they become friends with
the client; and in some cases, when the client lived nearby, they might actually develop and
maintain real friendships that last for years.
Thus, in many cases, we may be able to assume that it is not only the client's objective,
rational, financial interests that are being represented, but that in some cases, the agent may
be acting with the client's emotional interests in mind as well.
ID. The Berkeley, California Real Estate Market
Real estate markets operate very differently throughout the United States. The
description below is only of the North Berkeley, California market, and is not representative of
all markets within the country.
The North Berkeley market caters mostly to professionals, academics, lawyers,
engineers, architects, small businesspeople, and so on, although some of the houses within
the Board's jurisdiction appeal to other groups as well. Agents characterized the buyers and
sellers as articulate and educated about house-b ying, although first timer buyers here are as
nervous as anywhere else.
In 1990, there were 514 sales, with a total value of $151,215,886.00. The average
price of a single-family residential unit was $294,194.00. From January 1, 1991 - June 30,
1991, there were 246 sales, with a total value of $76,096,008.00. The average price of a sale
was $309,333.00.
The agent for the buyer is called the "selling agent"; the agent for the seller is called the
"listing agent". In California, both the listing and selling agents are paid by the seller. The
commission, which in Berkeley is often between 5-6 percent of the selling price, is usually
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divided 50/50 between the agents (however, the split can vary depending on circumstances). If
the agent works for an agency, the broker gets 50%. Thus, for example, on a $250,000 house
sale (not atypical in Berkeley at the time of the study), each agent earns $3125 in commission.
A $10,000 change in the closing price, while substantial to the buyer, represents only an
increase or decrease in actual received commission of $125 for each agent.
Thus, while both agents are motivated to get high closing prices to maximize their
commissions, movement even in the ten thousand-dollar range is not likely to overly inhibit or
excite the agents. They may prefer to close smaller, more certain sales rather than to try only
for a few larger, more risky ones.
Residential real estate is oriented towards relationships and the future. It is centered in
small, local markets, in which reputation matters. Aside from an agents' personal ethical sense,
the importance of acquiring and maintaining a reputation as a fair and honest agent tends to
limit collusion between agents to increase or decrease the price unnecessarily to deceive
parties. The selling agent wants to ensure that the house s/he helps the buyer acquire today
will become his/her listing tomorrow-- something that is unlikely to happen if that agent has to
cheat the current client by selling him or her a lemon. Thus, although a "bad deal" (in which the
buyer or seller ends up dissatisfied in some way) still results in commissions for the agents, the
potential cost in loss of repeat business and in harm to their reputation is so high that most
agents are motivated to ensure the clients' satisfaction. Lawsuits can lead to the loss of their
licenses. Generally, most agents prefer to have an ethical sale, even if they lose a few dollars
on their commission as a result.
The tightnessiii of the housing market may have an effect on the competitiveness of the
agents. Before this study began, while it was being considered by the Berkeley Board of
Realtors, the housing market in Berkeley was "loose": there were a large number of houses
available, but nothing was moving (San Francisco Chronicle, July 23, 1990). Thus, agents
were likely to be more cooperative than usual, and friendship was likely to have more of an
effect than in a heavily competitive market where houses are moving quickly. In the "looser"
market, friendship-related contacts might be used more frequently, for exampl , in order to
obtain recommendations of which house to show from among the many of a specific type
available. While the study was still under consideration, the Berkeley market picked up
momentum; however, nearly all the transactions reported occurred during the previous, slower
period.
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There were, in 1990-1991, 580 agents in the Berkeley Multiple Listing Service (MLS)
(licensed and registered agents are members). One hundred and ninety offices were listed in
the MLS. The system is not computerized; Berkeley agents refer to thick manuals that are
updated every week when seeking information about listings.
II.  Participants and Methods
IIA.  Participants
I interviewed thirty- wo licensed real estate agents in Berkeley, California. Participating
agents' cards were entered into a lottery for three prizes: a mini color television set (worth
approximately $300.00); and gift certificates good at a popular cafe (Peet's, worth
approximately $30 each). All prizes were awardediv.
The Berkeley Board of Realtors granted permission to conduct the study. Managers of
several agencies were contacted, and, with their permission, the researcher visited their
offices, made a 5-minute presentation of the goals of the research project, and took the
business cards of interested agents. (There was no way to determine whether the agents who
did not volunteer their cards were systematically different from agents who did participate.) I
contacted the agents within a week of collecting their cards, and set up interviews within two to
three days of the contact. In some cases, agents offered names of other individuals who might
be interested in participating. I contacted these individuals and independent agents (those not
affiliated with a large office) by telephone.
In total, 38 agents were contacted; only 3 agents declined to participate outright. Two
said they were too busy; the third would participate only if paid directly for the time. An
additional two agents failed to show up at our scheduled meetings, and did not return my calls
when I attempted to reschedule. One other agent did not answer my questions during the
interview. I also interviewed one other agent from upstate New York after all the California
interviews were completed.
Agents in the sample were licensed an average of 11.03 years (median 11). The
agents who were members of an agency had worked for that agency on average 9.16 years
(median 7). Among my informants, the average size of a transaction in the past year was
$289,290 (median $300,000), and the average number of transactions in the past year was
13.16 (median 10.5). All but two of the agents I interviewed were full-tim agents.
IIB.  Method
I conducted semi-structured interviews with each agent. Interviews lasted between 45
minutes and 2 hours, generally running about one hour. Agents discussed one transaction,
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whether or not it resulted in a sale and finished within the last six months (or in progress) that
met the following criteria:
1. The transactions concern a single-family home that was not church property, a
condominium, a tenants-in-common (an increasingly popular but legally and financially
complicated purchasing agreement), or probate property.
2. Two agents were involved (that is, the interviewee did not handle both sides of the
transaction).
3. There was interaction between the two agents, whether positive or negative.
Interviews were scheduled at the agents' convenience, and held at their choice of
office, home, cafe, or over lunch. Agents described themselves; described the transaction; and
then described the other agent involved in the transaction. The interviewer took notes in a
prepared booklet.
Factual questions about the transaction included the target agent's role (buyers' or
sellers' agent); the original listing price; the selling agent's personal estimate of the value of the
house; the number of other offers; the time between the opening and closing of escrow; and
so onv. Participants also reported whether there were any unresolved issues at the time of
closing, and whether the other agent or client attempted any last-minute manipulations to
change the price.
Agents responded to subjective questions about the other participants (clients and
other agent) in the transaction. Respondents described the nature of their relationship with the
other agent (how long had they known each other, how many transactions had they attempted,
were these interactions positive or negative experiences, and did they interact socially).
Agents reported whether the deal was more or less difficult than other transactions in their
experience; whether their client (and the other agent's client) was more or less difficult than
other clients in their experience; whether the clients were motivated to sell or buy; whether the
other agent was communicative, business-like, cheerful, friendly, trustworthy, and so on.
During the interview, agents were encouraged to describe more specifically the aspects of the
other agent or transaction which influenced their judgments. At the end of the interview, the
agents provided their opinion of whether friendship matters in their occupation.
I transcribed interviews with the agents soon after the interview from notes taken during
the interview. In a few cases, respondents were contacted for follow-up questions and
clarification.
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IIB1.  Questionnaire development
Four experienced real estate agents (minimum experience: 12 years) and an attorney
specializing in real estate law helped develop the questionnaire. None of these people were
included in the research sample. I followed an iterative process of interviewing these
informants, creating questions, presenting them to the informants for criticism, and revising the
questions. Three additional agents of differing levels of experience (not included in the current
sample) participated in a pilot test of the materials.
IIC.  Comparing Social vs. Business Friends
Very few of the agents in this study had recently dealt with another agent they would
consider a social friend. Relatively few transactions are conducted between social friends. An
agent with 25 years experience observed that although he had worked with over 1500 agents
from the Berkeley Board, and 600 more from Contra Costa (a neighboring area), "you might
never do another transaction with a particular agent" (28). Another respondent with 25 years'
experience had known another agent for 10 years, and in that time has had 5 transactions with
her (31). Yet another informant had also known someone for 10 years, but had done only 2
deals with that agent (11). The agent who was one of the strongest advocates of the
advantages of working with friends said that she had 10 close friends in her immediate
business network, and about 30 in a more extended circle. In her 21 years as a Berkeley
agent, she has had transactions with all of them, and she estimates that they comprise
approximately 10 percent of all her transactions (39). Most agents do not have that high a
percentage of interactions with friends because they do not seek them as aggressively as this
agent does.
The structure of the real estate market discourages interactions with social friends:
under normal circumstances, an agent deals with whatever client walks through the doorvi. As
one agent pointed out, "it is not uncommon to network with people you know. For a prize
listing, we may call our favorite agents in the area first. But mostly it's what comes in the door
(40)."
The client walking in the door may or may not be interested in a property (or a buyer) provided
by that agent's friend. As numerous agents pointed out, "We serve our clients", "we do what is
best for the client".
"If I have a house, and someone in my network has a client, that's OK, but I
wouldn't go through my Rolodex and look for a long shot. But if I have a buyer, I
have to serve that person's needs, and wouldn't limit him or her to my network."
(40)vii
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While some agents may be aware of friend-agents' properties (or buyers) that might be
appropriate for the client, the "decision rests with the clients".
Analyses were therefore made of differences in the data collected from business
friends: agents who had known-- and had had positive interactions with-the other agent
involved in the transaction for at least five years; and from unacquainted agents: those who did
not know the other agent prior to the transaction (or had met the agent only a few times in five
years)viii. The median length of acquaintanceship in the sample was five and one-half years:
Fourteen respondents had known and liked the other agent for at least five yearsix.
IID.  Dependent variables
The dependent variables for this study included: open-end d responses to questions
about how the agent conducted transactions and the role of friendship in transactions. Agents
reported how frequently they expect to interact with the other agent involved in the transaction
they reported (e.g., were they likely to phone the other agent for leads on the market, or for
advice; were they likely to share "war stories" with that person; and so forth). Agents also
provided ratings of client and transaction difficulty; business characteristics of the other agent;
how often they would engage in specific transaction-related behaviors with other agents (e.g.,
"phone for leads on the market"). These ratings were compared with other self-rating  of how
likely each agent is to engage in the behavior at all.
I reviewed the interview transcripts to determine what interaction issues the agents
themselves raised, and with what frequency. Agents raised forty issues. Table 4 lists these
issues and their frequency; the listing is divided by individuals dealing with agents they knew
and by agents who did not know the other agent with whom they were dealing.
III.  Results
Differences in agents' perceptions of the other agent, the transaction, and the other's
client were tapped through t-tests on the scaled dependent variables. T-tests compared the
means of the two groups on outcome variables such as client difficulty, transaction difficulty,
and friendliness of the other agent. (See Tables 1 and 2.)
IIIA.  Responses to the structured questions
IIIA1.  Transaction outcomes
The many types of transactions the agents reported made it difficult to compare friend's
and unacquainted agents' outcomes. The results of analyzing the non- "as is" sales contradict
hypothesis 1x. Business friends demonstrated a greater difference between the original listing
price and final selling price than did agents who did not know each other (friends, $20.26;
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unacquainted, $8.87, t = 1.70, 25 df, p = 0.10). However, dollar differences of this magnitude
are not meaningful on a $250,000 sale. Hypothesis 2 was supported, however. Agents who
were acquainted opened escrow sooner after the first offer than did agents who did not know
each other, t = 2.18 (22.3 df), p = 0.03.xi
IIIA2.  Process outcomes
Tables 1 through 3 provide the results of the t-tests performed on responses to the
structured questions. Agents reporting a transaction with a business friend were licensed on
average for a longer time than were non-acquaintances (business friends: 16.28 years; non-
acquaintances: 6.94, t = 3.32, 18.7 df, p = 0.003). Supporting hypothesis 3, acquaintances
perceived the other agent as significantly less difficult, more trustworthy, more cooperative,
and more prompt than did non-acquaintances (difficult agent t = 1.89, 22.8 df, p = 0.07;
trustworthy agent t = 2.22, 30 df, p = 0.03; cooperative agent t = 2.84, 19.5 df, p = 0.01;
promptness t = 2.01, 29 df, p = 0.05). (See Table 1.) These characteristics partially support H3,
as agents observed that these characteristics made transactions run more smoothly overall.
Table 2 indicates that Hypothesis 4 was not supported: there was a slightly greater tendency
for business friends than for non-acquaintances to bring up new issues after inspections were
completed (t = 2.04, 26 df, p = 0.05).
Business friends showed a nonsignificant tendency to have fewer meetings, phone
calls, and memos than non-acquaintances; business friends were seen as tending to provide
more and better quality information. Business friends tend to be asked somewhat fewer
questions about the market, particular transactions, or about leads. Business friends brought
up more new issues after the inspections than did strangers. However, Table 1 indicates there
was no difference in the number of major new issues raised by either group.
IIIB.  Responses to open-ended Questions
The agents who focused on the positive aspects of business friendship tended to be
more experienced than those who saw friendship as unnecessary or problematic. These "old
timers" (those with 10 years or more of experience also had other points of view that differed
from the newcomers'. In the sections that follow, I compare the old timers with the newcomers.
In this old timer's group, different behaviors manifest themselves than among the newer
agents. For example, old timers reported that contracts may be drawn tighter, with fewer
contingencies included in a multiple-off r situation, so that clients may be better controlled
from the outset (often guaranteeing a sale). Old timers also noted that they may walk away
from a property if someone else they know is representing a client who really wants or needs
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that property; in the words of one agent, they "constrain the thirst for the chase". In fact,
among themselves it seems that the old timers have learned to balance competition and
cooperation with friends, perhaps by having experienced that there really is "enough business
to go around".
IIIC.  The Role of Friendship
Hypothesis 3 suggested that business friends would see transactions as running
smoother than would non-acquaintances. Support for this hypothesis varied with the level of
the experience of the agent. Only two agents maintained that technical skills alone were
sufficient, that interaction style did not influence closings:
"Other problems are more important than interaction styles. Financing is a major
part of deals, for example (you have to know how to deal with that)". (12)
"If you are a true professional and want to see a house sold, friendship
shouldn't matter. Transactions don't go easier because of it." (36)
These agents had 4 and 2.5 years of experience, respectively.
Fifteen agents (46%) observed that business friendship had positive aspects:
"Friendship can facilitate transactions: If you know someone, you can predict
how they will react, you know how to present your side; it can help you be more
effective in shaping your own response." (42)
"...There's no need to be highly technically skilled. There's always someone
there during a transaction who knows what they're doing -- the other agent, a
broker. The people part is more important." (43)
"Skill is useful -- you can be successful in spite of yourself ...But friendship can
heighten cooperativeness and problem solving." (25)
These agents were the old timers, with at least 10 years in the business. Some (10 agents, or
31%) of these experienced agents saw a role for technical as well as interpersonal skills.
"Interaction styles matter a lot, but not all the time." (22)
"Interaction styles matter, but not much we can do about them. Business
friendship may hinder transactions if you focus on the friendship, rather than on
the transaction, you may not try hard enough for the client. But a good agent
can separate friendship and the transaction." (40)
A few (25% or 7 agents) were undecided about the effects of friendship but thought it might
get in the way:
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"Friendship matters for return of calls and for the pleasantness of the
transaction, but it doesn't matter for the close of escrow." (14)
"Friendship per se is irrelevant. It can make the transaction more comfortable,
but I wouldn't work harder on a transaction just because it was with a friend ...It
is comfortable to deal with a known quantity. You know their strong points and
weak points; it makes it better when you present an offer for example, because
you know your audience. It can be more uncomfortable because of the
possibility of locking horns. You are representing your client, and all that ...stuff
can get in the way of your relationship ...It can get adversarial." (43)
One agent with more than 15 years of experience said that not only does she believe in
the importance of business friendship; she tended to capitalize on it. She and about 30 good
business friends, all very experienced agents, met on a monthly basis to discuss transactions,
houses, clients, other agents, and the market generally. The group disbanded, she said,
because many people the "core" group did not want to invite began to show up at the
meetings. Another agent who had been involved in these meetings lamented the passing of
the group: it decreased the old-timers' use of their business associate networks. Whether or
not they believe that friendship per se matters, and no matter how they apply its principles, it is
clear that the majority of agents recognize that they must work together with the other agent,
and that to ignore the relationship imperils the transaction.
"Agents have to work together. Their duty is to bring together the transaction.
Since clients may be easy or hard to work with, so agents must be close and
ethical. If I don't represent the client well, or antagonize the other agents, I can
damage the transaction." (32).
IIID.  The Role of Trust
While the agents generally attributed greater trustworthiness to agents they had known for
some time than to agents they had not known (trustworthy agent t = 2.22, 30 df, p = 0. 3).
There was no experience-r lated split in the responses.
In general, the newcomer agents were more likely than the old-timers to consider trust
to be prevalent, and to be something they could and should count on during their transactions.
An agent with only five years' experience noted:
"You have to count on the other's trustworthiness. In general, agents here are
trustworthy. There are very few cases of dishonesty." (29)
Old timers were more skeptical, since many acknowledged that some of their own negotiating
strategies were manipulative. The old timers seemed to be willing to trust those in their
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established business friendship networks, but less willing to extend that trust to individuals they
do not know.
The distinction between the personal network and outsiders came through in these
comments made by an experienced agent. He had worked with the other agent he described
over 10 years. His comment:
"She is trustworthy because what she says is what happens. Sometimes the
clients can sabotage your work, but she's sufficiently guarded. I would take her
word on the prequalification of a client, and not ask to see the paperwork." (31)
Regarding another agent he did not know well, however:
"She would take bold steps forward without the client's okay, and ended up with
a hollow shell of an agreement. (As a result) I would try to get everything in
writing, with the clients' signatures." (31)
Other old timers acknowledged their conservatism in dealing with agents outside of their
network who have reputations for being "trustworthy":
"It's nice when they have a good reputation, but we are working for our clients. I
never trust another agent's words -- appearances are not enough." (27, 13
years' experience)
"I trust agents who are trustworthy--but I do like to get a prequalification
anyway." (42, 11 years' experience)
"I don't trust people on account of their reputations; only if I have known them
for many years, and have had experience with them. I don't trust other agents'
advice; instead, I go straight to my lawyer." (39, 21 years' experience)
On the other hand, this same agent said about transactions within the friendship network:
"We end up helping each other. Trust is the important part. I only feel I can trust
people I know this well. However, people trust me. If an inexperienced agent
makes a slip with me, I won't use it against them." (39)
One agent was blunt about the inappropriateness of trusting others:
"Trust is not so important: You control the situation. What are you trusting the
other person for? You are not relying on the other person . ... There were times I
relied on the other person's word, to my disadvantage. There are countervailing
forces to trust-- for example, brokers' demands and outside pressures. Trust
should be tempered by the knowledge of human nature and that we are paid on
commission." (25, 13 years' experience)
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Agents aren't always able to work only with other trustworthy agents, however. Early in
their careers, agents recognize that they cannot "badmouth" other agents (30, 2 years'
experience) to their clients, no matter how little they trust the other agent. However, in those
cases where agents find they have to work with someone they don't trust, they find ways to
warn their clients:
"If I have to (work with someone whose responsibility I don't trust) I would say
we need to be especially careful because he may not be following the same
disclosure laws as we do." (33)
"I will tell the seller, if you take offer A, you can make 10 grand more, but this
agent will f___ you" (39).
Another agent put the same thought in more polite terms:
"If I had two offers, one from an agent I knew would be likely hard to work
with: I would inform my client that though the other offer is lower, it is more
likely to come to a completion." (32).
IIIE.  Manipulation and Impression Management
The conscious creation of a friendly environment is termed "impression management".
This is the "conscious or unconscious attempt to control images that are projected in real or
imagined social interactions" (Schlenker, 1980:6). Impression management can be
manipulative and false, or it can be a genuine concern with creating a hospitable environment.
Real estate agents practice a great deal of impression management.
While transactions with social or business friends is not the norm for real estate agents,
they do rely heavily on what Kurth (1970) has referred to as "friendly relations". Agents regard
interaction styles as important to the outcome of a transaction.
Most agents I spoke with at least appeared to have a cheerful, friendly disposition.
"Transactions go well when the agents are open, compromising, and willing to share
information and to be flexible." (36) Agents serve clients best by maintaining a comfortable
working relationship with one another. All agents seem to prefer a professional milieu, and, in
most cases, a nonhostile, nonadversarial situation in which the cooperativeness, flexibility, and
communicativeness of the agents resembles "friendly relations".
Friendly relations of the type these agents develop in some cases could also be termed
false cordiality. Agents are simultaneously aware of performing this type of impression
management, and of receiving it. While those who mentioned that they do "pretend" to be
friendly have good reasons for such pretense, the recipients do not always appreciate it. On
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the other hand, no one pointed to examples where the technique hindered the transaction. It is
possible that the artificiality may have actually helped by covering, or at least rendering
ambiguous, negative or hostile feelings. One agent described a transaction in which the other
agent had been sloppy, and had done things without her client's approval; the experienced
agent said it was never clear what was going on during the transaction.
"I gave her every opportunity to save face...We put up with it because we
wanted to close ...I'll be friendly towards her in the future. For example, I'll use
'glad handing' at meetings. It can mend fences. It is important to get on with life.
The sooner I affect a friendly ambiance, the better it is for our work relationship."
(31, 25 years' experience)
In another case, an agent had worked with someone who tried to take advantage of his
more "senior" position in the field by having the newcomer do parts of his job -- running
errands, or paying for services that by law were his responsibility. He even asked her to
sacrifice part of her commission while he refused to give up any of his. Shortly after the
transaction closed, he saw the junior agent with another agent he regards as well respected. In
a classic case of "status by association", he has since become very friendly. The about-face is
likely to serve the new agent well, if they ever have an opportunity to work together in the
future.
Many of the strategies the experienced agents mentioned that they use on the behalf
of their clients seem to undermine the notion that anyone could trust them. However, these
agents were quick to draw the line between being manipulative in the client's interest and
being unethical-- although they admitted that the line was sometimes a thin one. "Shopping
offers" (some agents, aware of an incoming offer, might call other agents and ask if their
buyers were interested in making a higher offer) and purposely misrepresenting the clients'
financial position were considered definitely unethical. One agent noted simply "You put
yourself out of business if you are underhanded." Another observed that antagonistic agents
probably are doing both sides of a deal themselves (that is, they represent both the seller and
the buyer; about 15% of all transactions in Berkeley are dual agency for one reason or
another; of course, only a few of these are because the agent is unethical or hard to get along
with). However, misrepresenting the clients' emotional interest in the property, controlling the
clients' demands, and demonstrating anger, impatience, and false cordiality are considered
legitimate techniques. An agent with 14 years of experience commented straightforwardly,
"Sometimes you need to bluff. If your client really wants something the other
party won't give, and doesn't want to lose the property ...you can try to bluff. It's
a thin line." (40)
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An agent with 21 years' experience acknowledged a similar strategy:
"Manipulate as necessary. The hard thing is to remember what you say." (39).
Interestingly, however, the importance of actual (rather than simulated) business
friendship and its associated networks seem to be well understood by at least some less
experienced agents. As the old timer who reported the monthly meetings described above
pointed out, the group was disbanded because too many people not selected by the core were
beginning to show up at the meetings. It is revealing that the group disbanded because of its
popularity, rather than because complaints had been lodged against it.
IIIF.  The Impact of Experience on Attitudes Toward Friendship
The interview data revealed that a more complex set of processes than those originally
hypothesized characterize the practice of real estate in Berkeley. There are two real estate
agent groupings in Berkeley, divided by years of experience. The two groups operate under
distinctly different principles. Agents' attitudes towards the role of business friendship in their
dealings in particular are mediated by their seniority in the occupation. The "old-timers"' group
(more than 10 years' experience in Berkeley) operates on the basis of business friendship. The
new agents, while stressing friendly relations and the importance of trust in one another,
instead operates more "by the book". Less experienced agents' comments did not reflect the
old-timers' interest in or concerns for business friendship. Instead, the newer, less experienced
agents were concerned with maintaining friendly relations and obtaining accurate information.
IIIF1.  Sources of differences between the two groups
The differences between the two groups run deep: the "friendship" that is central to the
old timers becomes "friendly relations" in the new agents group. For the less experienced
agents, the existence of friendly interaction styles could be thought of as a "hygiene factor", to
borrow Herzberg's (1966) well-worn phrase. While friendliness does not guarantee the closing
or the customer's satisfaction, lack of friendliness (and particularly the existence of
non-"friendly" behaviors) can interfere with the transaction.
This crucial difference may be attributable to the increasing complexity of rules and
regulations and in the associated norms of the market over time. The legal system governing
transactions is becoming increasingly complex. There are more and more involved laws
regarding disclosure, licensing of agents, need for inspections, rules covering mortgage
lenders, and protection from increased litigation. The market is also more complicated than in
the past, because there is an increasing volume of houses being bought and sold by people
with more sophisticated knowledge of the market and of options for financing. Other
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complexities derive from financing. Formerly, banks and mortgage lenders discussed financial
options with real estate clients. Many new products have emerged, and each bank touts its
own, making it more difficult than ever for buyers to decide what to use. The opportunity to
develop creative financing options may therefore help some agents close a sale.
The increased complexity of the market and its regulations has been met by increased
training and emphasis on technical and legal aspects of transactions. Agents are taught to
avoid even the appearance of doing something wrong, and may therefore shy away from the
potential advantages of dealing with business friends, holding everyone at "arm's length", and
considering their own actions in terms of what is in the client's best interest. No longer can the
"Welcome Wagon" hostess become a real estate giant based on her friendliness, knowledge
of the area, and knowledge of what her clients wantxii.
Some of the newcomer agents could be more aptly described as real estate
technicians. As a result, suggest the old timers (as well as some of the less experienced
agents), many of these technicians are missing the point of why most clients hire agents in the
first place. As one agent pointed out, "Transactions are fine, they usually go through" (43)
assuming that the client is prequalified and the condition of the house is fully disclosed.
However, as many buyers and sellers who attempt to represent themselves discover, the
process can be frustrating, complicated, and certainly time consuming. Thus, the agents' main
role is as a facilitator. "Clients hire me to be angry and to worry so they can get on with their
lives." (24)
From this perspective, once an agent is retained, then, his or her technical skills are
only important insofar as they expedite a process that is likely to come to a successful
conclusion of its own accord.
While agents are not obligated to develop financing packages: they are obligated to
facilitate the transaction to ensure the closing, and to ensure the client's satisfaction. This is
where relationship issues become pivotal. "If agents don't get along, they may bicker, and this
may get in the way of closing escrow." (33) Similarly, other problems in the agents'
relationships can get in the way of escrow, and the failure of escrow would be the greatest
disservice of all to the clients. While one agent pointed out that "complications are often due to
clients', not agents,' personalities" (20), it is the agents' charge to overcome these problems, to
"assess and disseminate information in a palatable manner" (20).
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IV.  Conclusions
This study demonstrates that business friendship influences the process of real estate
transactions, affecting who is trusted, what sorts of issues can be brought up after escrow is
opened, and how the other agent is treated.
The study also revealed that agents' attitudes towards the role of friendship is mediated
by their years of experience. The more senior group emphasizes the role of business
friendship; while the less experienced group provides the impression of friendly relations while
emphasizing technical financial skills.
The clear distinction between the two groups and the agreement within the groups of
how transactions should be handled when done with business friends or with non-
acquaintances provides evidence of experience-related scripted behavior towards these
groups. The old timers had similar expectations for how trust would be earned, and in what
specific ways they would trust each other. They were not surprised by the one old-timer's
comment that she would "give up the chase" for a business friend in some situations, and they
said they would do it themselves, or had in fact done it.
The newcomers, on the other hand, thought that many of the old timers' "notions" were
wrong. The newcomers hold a different script. The newcomers could not imagine anyone ever
giving up the chase. Instead, they spoke much of "friendly relations" and the impression
management involved in pretending to be friendly. The newer agents expect to use and to
encounter impression management techniques.
It is important to further examine the interaction of business friendship and experience.
Is the "generation gap" between old timers and newcomers evidence of an occupational
change? Will business friendship fall by the wayside as a result of such change, and will
clients be harmed or benefited by this change? What aspects of business friendship, if any,
are critical to the effective practice of brokerage, and what aspects can be safely ignored?
Comments from the old timers suggested that the flow of information among agents could
differ based on friendship; a networking study might reveal the paths this information takes.
The agents' friendship scripts could be further explored using the technique of
"cognitive mapping" (Eden, Ackerman, & Tait, 1993). "Cognitive maps" provide the
cause-and-effect links that drive people's behaviors. It shows the relationship between the
characteristics, expectations, and behaviors that people hold. Using this technique, we can
compare agents' cognitive maps for friendship. If we find differences between the cognitive
maps of specific groups of agents (for example, old timers and new comers), we can anticipate
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how the groups are likely to come into conflict. Knowing where they have commonalties may
help us understand how to avoid or resolve that conflict. The technique can provide insight into
how agents can increase their efficiency.
While many studies test hypotheses about how people behave by isolating people from
the real-world context, such studies can miss interesting, real-life interactions. This study
attests to the fact that there are important advantages to talking to the people involved in the
occupation. The effect of business friendship exists, but is difficult to pin down in strictly
financial terms. A study focusing only on the financial outcomes might very well have missed
the effect of friendship on the transaction process. It would never have found the interaction
with years of experience.
Business friendship may be losing ground as the critical center of the real estate
business, while managed "friendly relations" seems to be taking its place. The complex laws
and regulations may uproot the importance of interpersonal interactions, both between agents,
and between agents and clients. The new emphasis on friendly relations rather than on real
friendship per se may be the harbinger of more technical, objectively "rational" real estate
practices to come. Some changes are already in the offing: Computerized listings, for example,
are already common in other parts of the country, limiting the role of business contacts on at
least one parameter.
If the goal is the most efficient placement of the most people in houses that satisfy
most of their needs, this evolution is welcome. Computerized matching systems, such as those
that were developed in Israel for housing the massive influx of Russian immigrants, might
provide a more efficient system. If, on the other hand, the goal is to find homes that people will
love, a different system is necessary. Computers do not recognize that people don't always
know what they want, but many real estate agents do. Agents can understand that a seller
may sacrifice some profit in order to sell to a family they like, or that a buyer may sacrifice
space for a view that she had never seen before.
Most real estate agents recognize that they still are in a "people business" where
interpersonal relations do matter, at least indirectly. If friendship doesn't exactly grease the
wheels of the real estate business, friendly relations allows those relationships to seem
smooth, and to allow these agents "(to help make) someone's dreams come true".(30)
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TABLE 1
Agent's Evaluation of Acquaintances and Strangers:
Responses to Structured Questions
Other Agents' Characteristics
How often would you:
+Acquaintance(n) Stranger (n) t (df)
Ask this person for information about the market
1.75(4) 1.88(9) 0.24(11)
Ask this person advice about particular transactions
1.00(2) 2.00(5) 1.88(5)
Ask this person for leads or inquiries
1.66(3) 2.33(6) 1.76(7)
Have social meetings with this person
2.33(3) 2.42(7) 0.18(8)
Accompany this person to professional meetings
2.00(3) 2.00(5) 0.00(1)
Share "war stories" with this person
2.00(3) 1.75(4) 0.44(3)
How effective is this person in solving problems
9.35(14) 8.38(18) 0.99(30)
How trustworthy is this person
11.21(14) 9.16(18) 2.22(30)**
How cooperative is this person
11.53(13) 9.22(18) 2.84(19.5)***
How would you rate this person's reputation
10.75(8) 8.33(6) 1.01(5.7)
+ "Acquaintance” is an agent the respondent has known at least 5 years, has had a positive relationship
and with whom the agent has had at least 1 transaction.
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RESPONSES TO STRUCTURED QUESTIONS:
Other Agents' Characteristics, cont'd.
Acquaintance (n) Stranger (n) t (df)
Did this person provide sufficient nformation
9.50(10) 8.66(15) 0.87(23)
How would you rate the quality of information provided
10.40(10) 9.50(14) 1.31(22)
+Relative number of face-to-face meetings
2.00(4) 1.81(11) 0.40(13)
Relative number of phone calls
2.00(8) 2.26(15) 0.93(21)
Relative number of memos
1.50(2) 2.00(4) 0.73(4)
Relative promptness of returning phone calls
3.00(13) 2.66(18) 2.01(29)**
Relative cheerfulness
3.00(13) 2.68(16) 1.59(27)
Relative formality of interaction style
2.38(13) 2.25(16) 0.49(27)
Relative informality of interaction style
2.12(8) 1.84(13) 1.05(19)
Relative emotional stability
3.00(13) 2.88(18) 0.84(29)
+ “Relative" to other transactions/agents the respondent has encountered over the past year or
two.
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TABLE 2
Agents' Evaluation of Acquaintances and Strangers:
Responses to Structured Questions
Transaction Characteristics
Acquaintance(n) Stranger(n) t (df)
Number of offers in a multiple-offer situation
1.46(13) 1.58(17) 0.18(28)
Number of counters
0.55(11) 0.86(15) 0.92(24)
+Significant problems raised during the inspection
0.57(14) 0.38(18) 0.75(30)
+Was a second inspection requested
0.64(14) 0.38(18) 1.42(30)
+Were any issues reopened after the inspection
0.15(13) 0.25(16) 0.61(27)
+Were any new issues brought up after the inspection
0.38(13) 0.06(15) 2.04(1.73)**
+Were any major issues brought up after the inspection
0.50(2) 0.25(4) 0.51(4)
+Were any attempts made at the last minute to change contract terms
0.00(4) 0.15(13) 0.80(15)
Listing agent's personal estimate of house value
404.16(6) 416.85(7) 0.09(11)
Original listing price of house discussed
345.07(13) 376.44(18) 0.47(29)
+ Yes/No responses only
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RESPONSES TO STRUCTURED QUESTIONS:
Transaction Characteristics, cont'd.
Acquaintance (n) Stranger (n) t (df)
Time between initial offer and opening of escrow
1.22(9) 5.13(23) 2.18(22.3)**
Length of escrow
57.50(2) 51.20(5) 0.33(15)
+Selling price
225.00(2) 286.60(5) 1.33(5)
++Estimated level of seller's motivation to sell
4.30(13) 3.94(18) 0.66(29)
++Estimated level of buyer's motivation to buy
3.00(13) 3.61(18) 1.25(29)
++Estimated overall difficulty of transaction
2.07(13) 2.47(17) 0.73(28)
++Estimated difficulty due to financial, legal or zoning problems
1.66(6) 2.10(10) 0.53(14)
++Estimated difficulty due to the other agent involved
1.30(13) 1.94(18) 1.89(22.8)*
++Estimated difficulty due to my client
2.23(13) 2.05(17) 0.29(28)
++Estimated difficulty due to other agent's client
2.00(13) 2.33(18) 0.57(29)
* p<10
** p<.05
+ As is and multiple offer situations were excluded because in these cases the original listing price was
the same as the selling price.
++ Measured on a 5-point scale, where 1 is “low” and 5 is “high.”
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TABLE 3
Agents' Evaluation of Acquaintances and Strangers:
Responses to Structured Questions
Agent's Experience
Acquaintance (n) Stranger (n) t (df)
Number of years licensed
16.28(14) 6.94(18) 3.32(18.7)***
Average transaction size (this year)
294.92(13) 292.44(18) 0.27(29)
Number of transactions (this year)
13.16(12) 13.16(18) 0.00(28)
* p <.10
** p<.05
***p<.01
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TABLE 4
Characteristics Important to
Closing a Transaction: Volunteered Responses
# (%) mentioning # (%) not mentioning
characteristics characteristics
Acquaintance Stranger Acquaintance Stranger
Respect is important+
3 (60) 2 (40) 10 (38.46) 16 (61.54)
Respect is not important
1 (100) 0 (0)
Efficiency is important
10 (52.63) 9 (47.37) 4 (30.77) 9 (69.23)
Imagination is important
3 (75) 1 (25) 3 (75) 1 (25)
Technical skills are important
4 (57.14) 3 (42.86) 8 (34.78) 15 (65.27)
Technical skills are not important
2 (100) 0 (0) 8 (34.78) 15 (65.27)
Protecting client as positive+
2 (40) 3 (60) 11 (45.83) 13 (54.17)
Protecting client as negative+
1 (33.33) 2 (66.67)
Reports on client's thoughts
0 (0) 3 (100) 14 (48) 15 (51.72)
+ The adjectives “important,” “positive,” and “negative” refer to the characteristics' contribution
to a successful transaction.
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VOLUNTEERED RESPONSES:
Transaction Characteristics, cont'd, p. 2
                   # (%) mentioning           # (%) not mentioning
                   characteristics           characteristics
                                        Acquaintance Stranger       Acquaintance
Stranger
Business-like behavior is positive
4 (42.86) 4 (57.14) 10 (41.67) 14 (58.33)
Business-like behavior is negative
1 (100) 0 (0)
Flexibility a important
4 (66.67) 2 (33.33) 10 (38.46) 16 (61.54)
Informality is important
5 (71.43) 2 (28.57) 9 (36) 16 (64)
Trustworthiness is important
7 (58.33) 5 (41.67) 7 (35) 13 (65)
Dishonesty is a problem
0 (0) 2 (100) 14 (46.67) 16 (53.33)
Deceitfulness is a problem
4 (57.14) 3 (42.86) 10 (40) 15 (60)
I have confidence in the other agent
1 (50) 1 (50) 13 (43.33) 17 (56.67)
I don't check other agent's information
0 (0) 1 (100) 14 (45.16) 17 (54.84)
Rudeness is a problem
0 (0) 2 (100) 14 (46.67) 16 (53.33)
Other agent "punishes" me
 0 (0) 2 (100) 14 (46.67) 16 (53.33)
Pressure by other agent exists
2 (50) 2 (50) 12 (42.86) 16 (57.14)
Delaying techniques were used
1 (50) 1 (50) 13 (43.33) 17 (56.67)
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VOLUNTEERED RESPONSES:
Transaction Characteristics, ont'd, p. 3
# (%) mentioning # (%) not mentioning
characteristics characteristics
Acquaintance Stranger Acquaintance Stranger
Other agent too busy
0 (0) 3 (100) 14 (48.28) 15 (51.72)
Experience is important
3 (42.86) 4 (57.14) 11 (44) 14 (56)
Volunteering information is positive
1(14.29) 1(85.71) 13 (52) 12 (48)
Sharing information is important
3 (42.86) 4 (57.14) 11 (44) 14 (56)
Lack of sharing information is a problem
1 (33.33) 2 (66.67) 13 (44.83) 16 (55.17)
Cooperativeness is important
3 (37.50) 5 (62.50) 11 (45.83) 13 (54.17)
Other agent's stability is positive
2 (33.33) 4 (66.67) 12 (45.15) 14 (53.85)
Other agent was emotionally unstable
2 (50) 2 (50) 12 (42.86) 16 (57.14)
Communicativeness is positive
5 (41.67) 7 (58.33) 9 (47.37) 10 (52.63)
Communicativeness is negative
0 (0) 1 (100)
Other agent gives excuses
2 (50) 2 (50) 12 (42.86) 16 (57.14)
Attention to details is positive
5 (55.56) 4 (44.44) 8 (36.36) 14 (63.64)
Attention to details is negative
1 (100) 0(0)
Overlooking details is not so bad
0 (0) 1 (100) 13 (43.33) 17 (56.67)
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VOLUNTEERED RESPONSES:
Transaction Characteristics, ont'd. p._4
# (%) mentioning # (%) not mentioning
characteristics characteristics
Acquaintance Stranger Acquaintance Stranger
Overlooking details is a problem
13 (43.33) 17 (56.67)
Details can be negative
2 (66.67) 1 (33.33) 12 (41.38) 17 (58.62)
Other agent structures our interactions
1 (50) 1 (50) 13 (43.33) 17 (56.67)
Other agent uses stereotypes
0 (0) 1 (100) 14 (45.16) 17 (54.84)
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 Endnotes
                                                 
i Other forms of friendship may also affect the transaction.  For example, friendship between agents and
their clients; friendship between the clients themselves; and friendships between agents and the lenders
may also influence transaction outcomes.  However, only relationships between agents are considered
here.
iiNumbers in parentheses refer to the respondent’s ID.
iii Many different terms are used for aspects of the real estate market.  Some agents refer to the
“tightness” of the market; some to the “speed” of the market; still others refer to whether it is a “seller’s”
or “buyer’s” market.  I am sure other terms exist.  My advisor for this profject, an experienced Berkeley
agent and past president of the Board of Realtors, used “tightness;” so will I.
iv Such lotteries are common in the real estate industry.
v The Project Booklet (interview protocol) is available upopn request from the author.
vi Two of the more senior agents mentioned that their business was based mostly on referrals.  The
agents working in agencies tended to refer to obtaining clients through “open houses” or walk-ins.  Many
agents also advertise in the local newspapers and magazines.
vii As another agent commented on reading this draft, “’limiting’” is not the same thing as ‘giving
preference to’ or ‘showing first’”
viii Only one re spondent reported an unpleasant transaction with an agent whom he had known, on
pleasant terms, for more than five years.
ix The analyses described below were also run comparing respondents who knew the other agent for any
length of time vs. those who had never met the other agent; there were no differences in the pattern of
results between these results and those reported below for business friends vs. unacquainted.
x The small size of the sample and the many confounding factors involved hampered the investigation of
the financial aspects of the transactions.  For example, there were too few cases of unsuccessful
transactions to permit a meaningful analysis of differences between acquaintances’ likelihood of closing.
There were similarly too many “as is” sales and multiple offer situations to allow a meaningful analysis of
differences between numbers of offers and couonters or between distances from listing to selling price.
In many “as is” sales, sellers tend to have a “take-it-or-leave-it” mind set, and there tend to be multiple
offers as well.  Therefore, counteroffers are often inappropriate, and the listing and selling prices tend to
be indentical. In the multiple offer situation, buyers’ attempts at counters are frequently met by the
sellers’ dismissing the offer and taking the next person on the list.
xi This finding is particularly interesting since, by law, escrow must be opened within 24 hours of the
acceptance of an offer.  However, the time between the first presentation of an offer and its acceptance
(marked by the opening of escrow) can vary substantially.
xii This is the real-life story of an agent in Ithaca, New York.
